Please Follow us on Gab, Minds, Telegram, Rumble, Truth Social, Gettr, X, Youtube, Instagram
Originally published at Andrew Korybko / Substack.
The sequence of Trump-mediated Nawrocki-Putin talks (whether in person or on the phone), the creation of a crisis-control channel between them, and the initial goal of mutual military pullbacks from the border could stabilize the post-war European security architecture.
Leading Polish conservative newspaper Rzeczpospolita published the results of a poll in early October about Poles’ opinion toward the scenario of President Karol Nawrocki meeting Putin on the sidelines of December’s G20 Summit in Miami. Poland was invited by the US to attend for the first time due both to Nawrocki’s close relationship with Trump and Poland becoming a $1 trillion economy last year. Rzeczpospolita’s poll revealed that 29.7% of Poles believe that Nawrocki should meet with Putin there.
According to the data, this is “supported primarily by opposition supporters (44 percent of responses), right-wingers (34 percent), and those who voted predominantly for the Confederation in the last parliamentary elections (75 percent). This view is held primarily by men (37 percent), people in their 30s (42 percent), residents of medium-sized cities (36 percent), and those with higher education (37 percent).” This finding was then interpreted by several experts who were interviewed by Rzeczpospolita.
Opinions ranged from ascribing it to a “belief that channels of communication should be maintained even with an adversary” to pro-Russian beliefs premised on the fear that “otherwise Russia will attack” Poland and even a belief that Russia could become an “ally” if an understanding is reached with it. Be that as it may, the 29.7% of Poles who support a Nawrocki-Putin meeting is slightly larger than the total of those who’d vote for the two libertarian-nationalist Confederation parties per reputable polling.
This suggests that such a scenario is beginning to gain popularity among mainstream voters. Of the three expert opinions expressed above, the first is therefore the most plausible, which will now be elaborated upon in the contemporary context of bilateral relations and the Ukrainian Conflict. To begin with, Poland’s participation in the International Criminal Court that issued a politicized warrant for Putin’s arrest and Nawrocki’s placement on Russia’s wanted list aren’t impediments to them meeting abroad.
Second, Poland is destined to play a leading role in NATO 3.0’s containment of Russia for geographic reasons, Warsaw’s command of what’s already European NATO’s largest army, and the credible possibility of the aforesaid two factors resulting in Polish leadership of the Intermarium. Accordingly, some level of coordination between Poland and Russia is required for stabilizing the post-war European security architecture, ergo the inevitable need for at least some future calls between their leaders.
Nawrocki is the commander-in-chief, after all, so all final military decisions rest with him. This leads to the third point about a hypothetical US-mediated de-escalation between Poland and Russia, which could build upon the spirit of Poland’s nascent “snowdrop diplomacy” with Russian ally Belarus, whose leader is in the midst of a rapprochement with the US and where Russian troops are also based. The creation of a crisis-control channel between them could lay the basis for mutual military pullbacks from the border.
The sequence of Trump-mediated Nawrocki-Putin talks (whether in person or on the phone), the creation of a crisis-control channel between them, and the initial goal of mutual military pullbacks from the border could stabilize the post-war European security architecture. This could also establish the grounds for more comprehensive mutual de-escalations between NATO 3.0 as a whole – regardless of whether Poland leads it – and Russia in the future. All three leaders would thus do well to consider this.
This analysis was originally published at the Russian International Affairs Council.
